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JUST AND UNJUST COMPENSATION: THE FUTURE OF THE
NAVIGATIONAL SERVITUDE IN CONDEMNATION CASES
Alan T. Ackerman*
Noah Eliezer Yanich**
In 1967, the U.S. Supreme Court, in United States v. Rands, expanded the navi-
gational servitude doctrine governing the federal government's power over land
adjoining a navigable waterway by severely qualifying the government's Fifth
Amendment obligation to compensate the landowner. This Article address the issue
in the following ways: Part I surveyes Congress'power to regulate navigable waters
under the Commerce Clause. Part II summarizes the development of the naviga-
tional servitude doctrine and some of its inhibitory effects on waterfront development,
especially under Rands. It explains the fundamental unfairness of the Rands prin-
ciple and demonstrates why this constitutional rule represents an illegitimate
extension of the original navigational servitude doctrine, which permits Congress to
take private property within the waterway (i.e., below its high water mark) without
incurring the obligation to pay just compensation. Part III turns to Section 111 of
the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1970 and examines cases and statutory language to
illustrate its operation. Finally, Part IV of this Article puts Section 111 in the con-
text of instances in which Congress has acted to restore rights to property owners in
other situations, and suggests revisions to Section 111 that would bring the rules
governing the determination of just compensation in riparian condemnations into
full conformity with those applicable to non-riparian condemnations.
In the seminal case of Gibbons v. Ogden,' the Supreme Court es-
tablished that Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce
under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution2 embraced the power
to regulate all of the nation's navigable waterways. This power has
since been held to apply to any body of navigable water, including
lakes, rivers, and streams, that has the requisite connection with
interstate commerce. Navigable lakes, rivers, and streams that cross
state boundaries are subject to congressional regulation, and even
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1. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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navigable bodies of water that are wholly within the boundaries of
one state may be regulated by Congress.3
The power to regulate navigable waterways has spawned the
"navigational servitude" doctrine, which allows the United States to
destroy or remove private property within the waterway. More sig-
nificantly, invoking this power does not trigger its obligation under
the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution to pay just compensation
to the owner. In a series of decisions4 that culminated in the Su-
preme Court's 1967 ruling in United States v. Rands, the Court
expanded the navigational servitude doctrine to numerous cases in
which the federal government takes or otherwise affects land ad-
joining a navigable waterway. While the government's Fifth
Amendment obligation to compensate the landowner was not
completely undermined in this context, it was severely qualified.
Under Rands, the government is not constitutionally required to
pay the landowner any portion of the condemned land's value at-6 •
tributable to its proximity to a waterway. Since the location of land
near a waterway often accounts for a significant portion of its mar-
ket value, this decision resulted in a severe hardship on affected
landowners, and received wide criticism as being unfair and eco-
nomically unsound.7 Rands helped establish one of the handful of
constitutional doctrines in the takings context that authorizes
payment of less than fair market value as just compensation for the
property taken. s
In 1970, Congress enacted Section 111 of the Rivers and Har-
bors Act of 1970 (Section 111) in an effort to alleviate some, but
not all, of the harshness of the Rands rule. 9 In the thirty years since
the enactment of Section 111, only a few reported condemnation
3. See, e.g., United States v. Byrd, 609 F.2d 1204, 1210 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding that
Congress may, as part of its power over navigable waterways, regulate wetlands that adjoin
intrastate lakes where the lakes "are used by interstate travelers for water-related recrea-
tional purposes.. ").
4. United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956); United States v. Chan-
dler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913).
5. 389 U.S. 121 (1967).
6. Id. at 123-24.
7. See generally Omnibus Water Resources Authorizations: Hearing on S. 3815 Before the Sub-
comm. on lood Control-Rivers and Harbors of the Senate Comm. On Public Works, 91st Cong.
(1970) [hereinafter Senate Hearings].
8. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028-29 & n.16 (1992) (discussing
situations in which the government has affected a "permanent physical occupation of land,"
but is nevertheless absolved of its obligation to payjust compensation).
9. See 33 U.S.C. § 595a (1994). For an excellent early treatment of the effect of Sec-
tion 111 on this area of the law, see Kerry R. Brittain, Comment, Navigation Servitude-The
Shifting Rule of No Compensation, 7 LAND & WATER L. REv. 501 (1972).
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cases have addressed this provision.' ° From these cases, as well as
the statutory language, the manner in which Section 111 affects
the determination of just compensation in land condemnation
proceedings is now generally clear. However, a few unanswered
questions remain.
Part I of this Article provides an overview of Congress' power
generally to regulate navigable waters under the Commerce Clause
of the U.S. Constitution. Part II summarizes the development of
the navigational servitude doctrine and some of its inhibitory ef-
fects on waterfront development, giving special emphasis to Rands.
It explains the fundamental unfairness of the Rands principle and
demonstrates why this constitutional rule represents an illegitimate
extension of the original navigational servitude doctrine, which
permits Congress to take private property within the waterway (i.e.,
below its high water mark) without incurring the obligation to pay
just compensation.
Part III turns to Section 111 and examines cases and statutory
language to illustrate its operation. Finally, Part IV of this Article
puts Section 111 in the context of instances in which Congress has
acted to restore rights to property owners in other situations, and
suggests revisions to Section 111 that would bring the rules govern-
ing the determination of just compensation in riparian
condemnations into full conformity with those applicable to non-
riparian condemnations.
I. CONGRESS' POWER TO REGULATE NAVIGABLE WATERWAYS
Although the Constitution does not expressly give Congress the
power to regulate the nation's navigable waterways, the Supreme
Court ruled early on, in Gibbons v. Ogden," that this power fell
within Congress' Commerce Clause powers. The power to regulate
is tied to "navigability" because this feature makes a waterway a
channel of commerce.
10. United States v. 30.54 Acres of Land, 90 E3d 790 (3d Cir. 1996); United States v.
320.0 Acres of Land, 605 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. 967,905 Acres of Land,
447 E2d 764 (8th Cir. 1971); United States v. 13.20 Acres of Land, 629 F Supp. 242 (E.D.
Wash. 1986); United States v. 8,968.06 Acres of Land, 326 E Supp 546 (S.D. Tex. 1971); Palm
Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 340 (1998), rev'd on other grounds, 208 E3d
1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000). See infra discussion of these cases at notes 188-215.
11. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1,193 (1824).
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The judicial definition of "navigable" has, however, expanded
considerably in the last two centuries. In The Daniel Ball, 2 the stan-
dard was whether a river or stream was "navigable in fact,,13-
namely, whether it is "used, or [is] susceptible of being used, in
[its] ordinary condition, as [a] highway of commerce .... ,,4 If a
waterway was navigable over any section, then Congress had the
power to control non-navigable portions in order to control the
navigable portions.
That standard for navigability expanded significantly over the
years. A waterway that was not navigable presently, but had been
navigable at one time, would still be considered "navigable" for
purposes of determining the application of the navigational servi-
tude doctrine. 16 The Court significantly expanded the reach of
navigability in United States v. Appalachian Power Co.'7 In that case,
the Court held that a waterway that was not navigable in its present
condition, but that might become navigable after the making of
improvements to it, was "navigable" for purposes of the doctrine.
Later, the Court found that the navigational servitude reached
streams meeting none of these criteria of navigability, so long as
they affected the navigability of some other connecting waterway.'9
The navigability of a waterway was no longer even a prerequisite to
its regulation by Congress. One commentator suggested that in
light of these two expansions in the power to regulate navigable
waterways, "[t]heoretically, at least, there are no waters in the
United States immune from the navigation power."20
12. 77 U.S. (10Wall.) 557 (1870).
13. Id. at 563.
14. Id.
15. See United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 703 (1899).
16. SeeArizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423, 453-54 (1931); see also Loving v. Alexander,
745 F.2d 861, 867 (4th Cir. 1984) (finding that a portion of a river met "the federal test of
navigability" because it was once [although was no longer] navigable in fact); Alameda
Gateway, Ltd. v. United States, 45 Fed. C1. 757 (1999) (following Loving). But see Boone v.
United States, 944 F.2d 1489, 1498-1500 (9th Cir. 1991) (rejecting the notion of a "dor-
mant" navigational servitude).
17. 311 U.S. 377 (1940).
18. See id. at 407.
19. See United States v. Grand River Dam Auth., 363 U.S. 229 (1960); Oklahoma ex rel.
Phillips v. Guy F Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508 (1941).
20. Eva Morreale, Federal Power in Western Waters: The Navigation Power and the Rule of No
Compensation, 3 NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL 1, 9 (1963). This is not necessarily an idle
concern. Where a homeowner's lakefront property is located on a body of water that feeds
into a navigable river, could the federal government condemn the property and then refuse
to reimburse the homeowner for the value attributable to the lake view? Or where a farmer
relies on a stream for irrigation, and the stream feeds into a navigable river, could the fed-
eral government condemn the farmer's property and then insist on paying only the fair
market value of arid desert land? Constitutionally, the answer would appear to be "yes."
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Congress' power to regulate navigable waterways has been in-
creased in at least one other way since the Court's 1824 decision in
Gibbons. At one time, it was assumed that Congress could only ex-
ercise the power for a navigational purpose.2 ' As the law actually
developed, however, it is no longer necessary to show that naviga-
tion is the sole or even the principal purpose of the governmental
22
action.
These developments in the law led the Supreme Court to ac-
knowledge in 1979 that Congress' power to regulate the nation's
waterways is "best understood when viewed in terms of more tradi-
tional Commerce Clause analysis than by reference to whether the
stream in fact is capable of supporting navigation or may be char-
acterized as 'navigable water of the United States.' ,23 Under the
most recent Commerce Clause decisions, the test for determining
whether Congress has the power to regulate an activity is whether
the activity "substantially affects" interstate commerce.24
In a 1956 case, the Court stated that " [i]t is not for courts... to
substitute their judgments for congressional decisions on what is
or is not necessary for the improvement or protection of naviga-
tion. 25 In light of a very recent Supreme Court decision, 6 however,
21. See id. at 9-10.
22. See United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 223 (1956) (upholding the
limitation of compensation in connection with a project which the Report of the Chief of
Army Engineers described as benefiting navigation only incidentally). Professor Morreale
suggested that while the requirement of at least an incidental benefit to navigation imposes
a theoretical check on Congress' regulation of the nation's waterways, the Court has "ac-
cept[edl at face value congressional declarations that particular projects are necessary for
or would 'benefit' navigation." Morreale, supra note 20, at 11-12. See also Twin City Power
Co., 350 U.S. at 224 ("It is not for courts ... to substitute their judgments for congressional
decisions on what is or is not necessary for the improvement or protection of navigation.").
In light of two recent Commerce Clause decisions, the Supreme Court may be more willing
today to carefully examine congressional findings regarding navigation or regarding the
extent to which an activity to be regulated "substantially affects" interstate commerce. See
infra text accompanying notes 25-29.
23. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 174 (1979).
24. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995). The Court in Lopez struck
down a federal statute on Commerce Clause grounds for the first time since 1935. The fed-
eral statute made it a criminal offense for any individual to knowingly possess a firearm
within a distance of 1000 feet from the grounds of a public, parochial, or private school. Id.
at 551. The Supreme Court held that because the statute "has nothing to do with 'com-
merce' or any sort of economic enterprise," id. at 561, Congress exceeded its authority
under the Commerce Clause in enacting it. Id. The last decision before Lopez to strike down
a federal statute on Commerce Clause grounds was A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). Five years after Lopez was decided, the Supreme Court again
struck down a federal statute on Commerce Clause grounds. United States v. Morrison, 525
U.S. 598 (2000).
25. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. at 224.
26. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549.
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there is some reason to believe that the courts may not automati-
cally accept congressional findings that a project benefits
navigation or, to use the analysis favored in Kaiser Aetna, that it
"substantially affects" interstate commerce. In United States v. Morri-
son,27 the Court, in striking down a section of an act as outside the
Commerce Clause power, found that congressional findings that
the subject matter of the statute affected interstate commerce were
inadequate. Because the five members of the Court who com-
prised the majority in Morrison have also adopted an expansive
reading of the Takings Clause in the area of regulatory takings, 8
one should not automatically assume that the judiciary will con-
tinue to defer to congressional findings in cases involving the
constitutionality of congressional regulation of navigable water-
ways.2 It is likely that there will be waterway projects whose effects
on interstate commerce will be so attenuated that the Court could
declare them to be outside Congress' power to regulate interstate
commerce.
II. THE NAVIGATIONAL SERVITUDE
The power to regulate interstate commerce, as a general matter,
is subject to the requirements of the Fifth Amendment Takings
Clause. As such, the general rule is that if Congress takes private
property in the exercise of its Commerce Clause powers, it must
30pay 'just compensation" to the affected property owner.
27. 525 U.S. 598 (2000).
28. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (finding that the city's re-
quirement that a landowner dedicate a portion of her property in a flood plain as a public
greenway and for a pedestrian/bicycle pathway easement as a condition of allowing devel-
opment of the property violated the Fifth Amendment). The five Justices who formed the
majority in Morrison (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas) also comprised the five-member majority in Dolan. Those same Justices made up
the majority in Lopez.
29. The Supreme Court may be inclined to carefully review broad assertions of federal
power over navigable waterways as a way of limiting federal control over environmental
matters or water safety issues such as chlorination or dechlorination. See, e.g., Solid Waste
Agency of N. Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs., 531 U.S. 159, 174
(2001) (holding that Congress had not intended to extend federal jurisdiction for environ-
mental protection purposes over small isolated ponds that have no direct impact on
"navigable waters" [as the term is used in the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1994)],
thus avoiding "the significant constitutional and federalism questions" [i.e., whether such
an assertion of power would exceed Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause]
raised by respondents' interpretation of the Act).
30. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 174, 177-78 (1979) (where Con-
gress properly exercises its regulatory power under the Commerce Clause, and regulation
amounts to a taking, the Fifth Amendment generally requires payment of compensation).
[VOL. 34:4
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The Supreme Court has developed a different rule, however, to
govern the situation where Congress takes private property in the
exercise of its power to regulate waterways. In that circumstance, it
is frequently said that the government has a "navigational servi-
tude," which enables it to destroy or take private property without
31the necessity of paying compensation to the property owner.
Under the Supreme Court's "navigational servitude" doctrine,
private property is affected in two principal ways. One is that when
the government forces the removal of, destroys, or simply takes
personal or real property located below the high water mark of a
navigable waterway, it has no constitutional obligation to pay any
just compensation. The other is that when the government con-
demns land above the high water mark, it need only pay
compensation which is adjusted to exclude any value attributable
to the property's proximity to the waterway.
A. The Rule of No Compensation
The Supreme Court has described the "navigational servitude"
as a "superior navigation easement 32 and a "dominant servitude."
3
But the rule of no compensation that is the essence of the servi-
tude does not apply to all exercises of the power to regulate
navigable waterways in which private property is taken or de-
stroyed. The Supreme Court "has never held that the navigational
servitude creates a blanket exception to the Takings Clause when-
ever Congress exercises its Commerce Clause authority to promote
navigation.",4
The "rule of no compensation" typically arises in one of two basic
situations in which the regulation of a waterway results in damage to
private property. One concerns the erection of structures in, or the
31. See id. at 175.
32. United States v. Grand River Dam Auth., 363 U.S. 229, 231 (1960).
33. United States v. Cherokee Nation of Okla., 480 U.S. 700, 704 (1987).
34. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 172. In Kaiser Aetna, the Supreme Court held that even
though a dredged pond owned by the defendant landowners fell within the definition of
"navigable waters" as the Court had used that term in discussing Congress' power under the
Commerce Clause, the landowners were entitled to compensation if the Army Corps of
Engineers insisted on turning the pond into a public aquatic park, because "the Govern-
ment's attempt to create a public right of access to the improved pond [went] so far beyond
ordinary regulation or improvement for navigation as to amount to a taking .. " Id. at 178.
See also Boone v. United States, 944 E2d 1489, 1493 ("Though similarly grounded in the
commerce clause, the navigational servitude is distinct from the power to regulate navigable
waters.") (citations omitted).
SUMMER 2001 ]
Univesity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 34:4
dredging and filling of, a navigable waterway. The other concerns
governmental action that denies a riparian landowner access to his
or her property.
1. Regulation Regarding the Placement of Structures in or the Filling
of Navigable Waterways-The Court has held that where regulation
requires the removal of obstructions to navigation, such as bridges,
wharves, and power plants, or prevents the erection of such struc-
tures, the government is not obligated to pay compensation under
the Takings Clause, despite the obvious value of these structures to
those who erected them. 35 As a general rule, any structure that lies
below the high water mark of the waterway,36 or above the water-37
way, is subject to injury or destruction by governmental action
without payment of compensation. The same rule applies when
the federal government denies a landowner permission to erect a
structure on a navigable waterway, or permission to dredge or fill
part of a navigable waterway, s and the landowner alleges a regula-
tory taking.39 The fact that the applicable state law recognizes
private property rights in submerged land does not affect the op-
eration of this rule.4°
The rule of no compensation is particularly harsh insofar as it
has been construed to apply to private property rights existing in
land which was formerly part of a riverbed, but was later filled by
35. See, e.g., Greenleaf Johnson Lumber Co. v. Garrison, 237 U.S. 251, 256, 258-64
(1915) (regulation requiring removal of wharves did not obligate government to pay com-
pensation); United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913)
(regulation requiring removal of power plant from waterway did not give rise to obligation
to pay compensation); Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364 (1907) (no compen-
sation required where government forced costly changes to existing bridge).
36. SeeUnited States v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co., 312 U.S. 592, 599
(1941) (railroad tracks).
37. See Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364, 397 (1907) (bridge over wa-
terway).
38. See Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States, 208 E3d 1374, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2000);
United States v. 30.54 Acres of Land, 90 E3d 790, 796 (3d Cir. 1996). Section 10 of the Riv-
ers and Harbors Act of 1899 requires a landowner to obtain a permit from the Army Corps
of Engineers before engaging in dredging or fill operations in a navigable waterway. 33
U.S.C. § 403 (1994).
39. Under the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, anyone who wishes to perform work
that affects a navigable waterway of the United States must first obtain a permit from the
Army Corps of Engineers. 33 U.S.C.'§ 403 (1994). Section 404 of the Clean Water Act re-
quires the Corps to take environmental concerns into account in deciding whether to grant
such a permit. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994).
40. See Chicago, 312 U.S. at 596 (stating "[w]hether, under local law, the title to the bed
of the stream is retained by the State or the title of the riparian owner extends to... [the]
low water mark, the rights of the title holder are subordinate to the dominant power of the
federal Government in respect of navigation") (footnotes omitted).
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natural or artificial means.4 ' Nonetheless, the courts have held that
private property rights in dry land formerly under the high water
mark of a navigable waterway in 1794, when the United States
Constitution was ratified, or in structures that have been placed on
such land, may be destroyed or injured by governmental regula-
tion without payment ofjust compensation.
This aspect of the rule of no compensation has prompted con-
cern that large parts of New York, Boston, and San Francisco
could, at least in theory, be taken by the federal government with-
out any constitutional obligation to pay just compensation.43 That
is because substantial parts of those cities were erected on filled
land that was once a part of navigable waters.44 While a 1949 deci-
sion of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia suggests that there would be no constitutional impedi-
ment to such a taking without compensation, 45 a more recent
• 46
Third Circuit decision suggests otherwise.
41. United States v. Martin, 177 F.2d 733 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (holding that filled land be-
neath the 1794 high water mark of a portion of the Potomac River belongs to the United
States).
42. Id. at 734 ("[a]ny structure is placed in the bed of a stream at the risk that it may
be so injured or destroyed.") (quoting Chicago, 312 U.S. at 599). In other words, if a land-
owner chooses to place a structure in a waterway, he does so with the knowledge that the
government may require the removal of the structure without the payment of compensa-
tion. The Martin Court added that, as such, the land that had been filled and a wharf that
had been constructed on it "may at any time be taken without compensation, in the interest
of navigation, provided the taking is not arbitrary." Id. The Court did not elaborate on what
would constitute an "arbitrary" taking in this context.
43. See Senate Hearings, supra note 7 (reproducing the following article: John P. Turner,
The Navigation Servitude, TITLE NEWS, Jan. 1969). John Turner was a former Senator and
Vice-President and General Counsel, Chicago Title Insurance Co. These hearings were
conducted in connection with a predecessor to the bill (introduced by the 92nd Congress)
that ultimately became Section 111 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1970, which is dis-
cussed infra in text at notes 104-166.
44. See id. at 197.
45. See Martin, 177 F.2d 733, discussed supra in note 42.
46. See United States v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 498 E2d 597 (3d Cir. 1974). In Stoeco
Homes, the federal government sought to enjoin Stoeco Homes from any dredge, fill, or
construction activities on land that prior to 1927 was part of a saltwater marsh, subject to the
ebb and flow of the tide. The court concluded that since the marshlands were subject to the
ebb and flow of the tide, they were navigable waterways within the meaning of the Rivers
and Harbors Act. Id. at 610. However, the court declared that the government's navigational
servitude in the shoreward lands had "long since been surrendered" by 1951, when Stoeco
purchased property that had been fast lands for twenty-four years. Id. at 611. The court
observed that "[c]ertainly a construction [of Section 10] which would, after government
inactivity from 1890 to 1970, cast doubt upon the property status of thousands of acres of
former tidal marshes would present problems under [the Fifth] amendment," and reversed
the trial court's injunction against construction. Id. See also United States v. Rands, 389 U.S.
121, 126 (1967) (discussing Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893),
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform[
Such sweeping applications of the no-compensation rule may be
limited, however, by the requirement that the purpose of the regu-
lation in question be related at least in some fashion to navigation.
In other words, while navigation need not be the sole purpose or
even the primary purpose, some navigational purpose is still re-
quired. In Palm Beach Isles Associates v. United States,47 the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit considered whether the rule of no
compensation applied to the denial of a permit to fill part of a
navigable waterway. The property in question was located on and
along a long spit of land in Florida situated between the Atlantic
Ocean on the east and Lake Worth on the west. 48 It consisted of
49.3 acres of submerged land in the lake and 1.4 acres of shoreline
wetlands.
In 1988, the owners applied for a permit to fill the submerged
lake bottom and contiguous wetlands, in accordance with Section
10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899.50 In a letter to the land-
owners, the Army Corps of Engineers denied the request for a
permit primarily on environmental grounds, but added in an ac-
companying memorandum:
Navigation: Shallow water depths that already exist in the
proposed project area have limited boating activities to shal-
low draft vessels. Therefore, other than the elimination of
[49.3] acres of navigable waters, the project should not have a
significant adverse impact on navigation, in general. 5'
The owners brought an inverse condemnation action, alleging
that the denial of the permit amounted to a regulatory taking of
their property insofar as it prevented any economically viable use
of the 50.7 acre parcel. They sought more than ten million dol-
lars in just compensation from the federal government.5 3 The
government argued that regardless of the purpose of the regula-
tory imposition, there can never be a taking of property in a
and suggesting that the doctrine of estoppel may in certain circumstances preclude applica-
tion of the rule of no compensation).
47. 208 F.2d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
48. Id. at 1377.
49. Id.
50. 33 U.S.C. § 402.
51. Palm Beach, 208 E3d at 1378.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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waterway subject to the navigational servitude." The government
argued alternatively that even if the regulatory purpose must be
related to navigation for the government to avoid paying just com-
pensation, this regulation served such a purpose.55
The court of appeals first held that under some circumstances,
the government could invoke the navigational servitude doctrine
as a defense to a regulatory taking claim. 56 "In order to assert a de-
fense under the navigational servitude," the court said, "the
Government must show that the regulatory imposition was for a
purpose related to navigation ....
The opinion of the Fifth Circuit in Palm Beach Isles revealed that
the court took seriously the requirement that the government
show a regulatory purpose that was related at least in part to navi-
gation. It found that the memorandum contained contradictory
findings regarding navigation, and that the "clarify[ing] 5 affidavit
of the individual at the Army Corps who prepared those findings
was not consistent with the language of the memorandum. 60 As
such, the court ruled that "the issue of whether the Government
had a navigational purpose for its permit denial is a disputed ma-
terial fact . ,,61 The court vacated the lower court's summary
62judgment in favor of the United States, and remanded for further
proceedings to determine whether bona fide navigational reasons
existed for the permit denial.
54. Id. at 1384. The plain implication of the government's argument was that it could
undertake a project to fill the submerged land itself and then appropriate the property
without having to payjust compensation to the landowners.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1385.
58. Id. at 1384-86.
59. Id. at 1386.
60. See id.
61. Id.
62. The district court's decision in Palm Beach Isles could have been influenced by a
factual background unlikely to evoke the court's sympathy. The landowners in that case sold
off 261 acres of prime "upland oceanfront property" on one side of a road, leaving them
with 50.7 acres, all but 1.4 acres of which was submerged, on the other side. Id. at 1377.
Thus, they sold off the better part of their property, leaving themselves with little more than
a small spit of land and a potential inverse condemnation claim.
63. Deciding whether there is a navigational purpose underlying government action
that affects use of a navigable waterway should not be confused with determining whether
the action has a sufficient nexus with interstate commerce. A court could determine that a
particular action is within Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce, but that it does
not have an underlying navigational purpose, and hence that the rule of no compensation
does not apply.
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While the no-compensation rule may not, as a practical matter,
make large parts of New York, Boston, and San Francisco subject to
uncompensated seizures, the rule does have at least one deleteri-
ous real-world effect. The rule deters waterfront development
because the threat of condemnation without compensation in-
creases the risks for investors and real property lenders. As one
commentator has stated, "[t]itle companies and lawyers list the
[s]ervitude as a title exception and as a result lenders will not
make loans which are subject to the [s]ervitude and title to such
developments are unmarketable."
64
Attempts to provide a principled justification for the rule of no
compensation when private property located within a navigational
65
servitude is destroyed or injured have been largely unavailing.
Longstanding common law principles provide only limited support
for the Supreme Court's broad application of the navigational ser-
66
vitude doctrine. Because Congress exercises its power over
waterways in a manner that far exceeds the scope of regulation at
common law, the "notice" theory (i.e., the theory that anybody
who purchases property is "on notice" of common law restrictions
regarding one's use of the property) likewise provides little sup-
port for the rule of no compensation. Finally, the no-
compensation rule seems less justifiable today than it might have
been in an earlier era because waterways are no longer as essential
to the movement of goods as they were when fewer alternative
forms of transportation were availablei5
2. Regulation Which Denies Access to Riparian Landowners-The
second basic situation in which the no-compensation rule applies
is when government regulation causes a riparian owner to lose ac-
cess to a navigable waterway. In the first case of that kind, Gibson v.
United States,69 a riparian landowner sought compensation when
the government's construction of a dike prevented her from using
her landing for the shipment of products and supplies to and from
her farm, which was located on the uplands portion of the Ohio
River." The construction of the dike did not result in any physical
64. See Senate Hearings, supra note 7, at 188 (Statement of EugeneJ. Morris, Chairman,
Special Committee on Federal Navigation Servitude, Section on Real Property, Probate and
Trust Law, American Bar Association).
65. See Morreale, supra note 20, at 21-31 (surveying various theories and concluding
that they are not persuasive).
66. See id. at 25-28.
67. See id. at 23-25, 31.
68. See id. at 31.
69. 166 U.S. 269 (1897).
70. Id. at 269-70.
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invasion of Mrs. Gibson's property by water or otherwise, but in-
stead prevented boats from traveling to and from her property."
The Supreme Court affirmed a lower court ruling dismissing the
landowner's suit on the ground that she was entitled to no com-
pensation as a matter of law.7" In so doing, the Court appeared to
rest its holding on both ordinary eminent domain principles as
well as the navigational servitude doctrine.' The Court ruled first
that "the damage of which Mrs. Gibson complained was not the
result of the taking of any part of her property, whether upland or
submerged, or a direct invasion thereof, but the incidental conse-
quence of the lawful and proper exercise of a governmental
power."7 4 By emphasizing that there was no direct taking or physi-
cal invasion of land, the Court seemed to be saying merely that
there had been no "taking" for purposes of the Fifth Amendment,
which is a fairly unremarkable pronouncement.
7 5
Later in the opinion, however, the Court invoked the
navigational servitude doctrine as a ground for its ruling, when it
observed that "riparian ownership is subject to the obligation to
suffer the consequences of the improvement of navigation in the
exercise of the dominant right of the Government in that
regard." 76 In a subsequent decision, United States v. Commodore
71. Id. at 270.
72. Id. at 276.
73. See, e.g., United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 123 (1967).
74. Gibson, 166 U.S. at 275.
75. Even without a direct invasion of property, a property owner today can still seek
compensation if the functional equivalent of a taking has occurred. That claim, however,
requires the owner to demonstrate that the governmental action "go[es] too far.... ." Lucas
v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992). See also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of
New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (applying an "ad hoc" balancing test in concluding that
no compensable taking had occurred as a result of the New York City Landmark Commis-
sion's refusal to approve plans for the construction of a 50-story office building over Grand
Central Terminal). Based on the facts as related in the Gibson opinion, however, it seems
doubtful that the landowner could have made the showing necessary to prove a regulatory
taking in an inverse condemnation suit. Nonetheless, modern cases do suggest that a land-
owner in an inverse condemnation case will prevail where the regulation has effected a
complete loss of access to his or her property. See, e.g., Laurel v. State of Connecticut, 362
A.2d 1383, 1387 (Conn. 1975) ("[tlhe destruction of the right of access to a parcel of land
constitute[s] a taking of it in a constitutional sense .... .") (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted); Jordan v. Town of Canton, 265 A.2d 96, 98 (Me. 1970) ("Total deprivation
of access is equivalent to a taking requiring compensation . .. ."); Burnquist v. Cook, 19
N.W.2d 394, 398 (Minn. 1945) ("Clearly, an owner of land abutting on a street cannot con-
stitutionally be deprived of all access to his premises without compensation ... .") (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted). See also New Hampshire v. Shanahan, 389 A.2d 937,
938 (N.H. 1978) ("[A]t some point the right of access becomes so restricted by State action
that it must be deemed 'taken,' and the State must compensate the landowner for such
taking.").
76. Gibson, 166 U.S. at 276.
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Park,77 the Court held that "an owner of land adjacent to navigable
waters, whose fast lands are left uninvaded, has no private riparian
rights of access to the waters to do such things as 'fishing and
boating and the like,' for which rights the government must pay.,,78
Because these deprivation of access cases involved no physical
invasion of upland property-i.e., no physical invasion of lands
above the high water mark-there was no need for the Court to
resort to the navigational servitude as a ground for denying com-
pensation to the landowner. The traditional eminent domain
principle denying compensation when there has been no appro-
priation or physical invasion of property would have been an
adequate basis for the holdings. Gibson (and to a lesser extent,
Commodore Park) relied in part on this principle. Nevertheless, the
no-compensation rule in these cases has usually been viewed as an
application of the navigational servitude doctrine . 9 So construed,
these cases provided support for a major extension of the doctrine
in United States v. Rands."" In Rands, the Court held that the just
compensation due riparian landowners in formal eminent domain
proceedings did not include any compensation for that portion of
the value of the property attributable to its proximity to a water-
way. This expansion of the navigational servitude eventually
prompted corrective legislation by Congress intended to amelio-
rate the harshness of the Rands rule.
77. 324 U.S. 386 (1945).
78. Id. at 391. See also Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141 (1900). In Scranton, the owner
of land bordering a navigable river sued the defendant, an agent of the United States, when
the federal government constructed a pier that effectively deprived him of access to the
river. The Court held that the landowner was not entitled to compensation, stating:
If the riparian owner cannot enjoy access to navigability because of the improvement
of navigation by the construction away from the shore line of works in a public navi-
gable river or water, and if such right of access ceases alone for that reason to be of
value, there is not, within the meaning of the Constitution, a taking of private prop-
erty for public use, but only a consequential injury to a right which must be enjoyed.
. ."in due subjection to the rights of the public"-an injury resulting incidentally
from the exercise of a governmental power for the benefit of the general public, and
from which no duty arises to make or secure compensation to the riparian owner.
Id. at 164.
79. See, e.g., Morreale, supra note 20, at 33.
80. 389 U.S. 121 (1967).
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B. The Rule of Partial Compensation in
Condemnations of Riparian Lands.
In Rands,8' the Supreme Court extended the navigational servi-
tude doctrine to condemnation cases involving riparian land by
establishing a rule under which landowners would not be constitu-
tionally entitled to full compensation for the value of their
property. In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that in formal
eminent domain proceedings, the government need not pay for
any portion of the property's value that was attributable to its po-
tential use as a port site on a navigable waterway.2
In Rands, the respondents owned land along the Columbia
River that was condemned by the federal government in connec-
tion with the John Day Lock and Dam Project.3 The district court
ruled that "the compensable value of the land taken was limited to
its value for sand, gravel, and agricultural purposes and that its
special value as a port site could not be considered. 's4 The Ninth
Circuit reversed, concluding that the government had taken a
compensable right of access from the respondents and that "port
site value should be compensable under the Fifth Amendment.
'8
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed, holding that
no compensation need be paid to a landowner for value attribut-
able to a property's proximity to a waterway. In so ruling, the Court
stated that the "proper exercise" of the navigational servitude
is not an invasion of any private property rights in the stream
or the lands underlying it, for the damage sustained does not
result from taking property from riparian owners within the
meaning of the Fifth Amendment but from the lawful exer-
cise of a power to which the interests of riparian owners have
always been subject.86
The logic and language of the Rands opinion left no doubt that
in condemnations of riparian land, any value attributable to the
land's proximity to a waterway could be ignored in computing just
81. Id.
82. Id. at 124-25.
83. Id. at 121-22.
84. Id. at 122.
85. Id. (quoting from United States v Rands, 367 F.2d 186, 191 (9th Cir. 1966)).
86. Id. at 123 (citations omitted).
SUMER 2001 ]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
compensation, without running afoul of the Fifth Amendment.
This is precisely how the lower courts have read the opinion.
For example, in United States v. 8,968.06 Acres Of Land,s7 the dis-
trict court applied Rands in holding that the owners of land
bordering the Trinity River were not entitled to compensation for
the value attributable to the lands by contiguity to navigable wa-
ters. In doing so, however, the court expressed some concern as to
the fairness of its ruling, and invited the landowners to seek re-
dress from the legislative branch:
The Court is aware that this decision reaches a result which is
harsh upon the condemnees and which, superficially, appears
to depart from the market value standard of just compensa-
tion. In their excellent brief, defendants have pointed out
that the prospect of diminished compensation for riparian
property may have an unsettling effect on the mortgage mar-
kets and may retard development of riparian lands. Although
possibly valid, this argument implies a corrective which is
available only through the political process, and is thus ad-
88dressed to the wrong forum.
The district court's 1970 decision in 8,968.06 Acres was vacated
on rehearing in 1971 as the result of the subsequent passage of
Section 111 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1970, 9 which Con-
gress made applicable to cases pending on its effective date. 90
Indeed, the harshness of the original ruling may have prompted
the legislative initiative that culminated in the passage of Section
111.9,
The broad rule announced in Rands represents the most con-
spicuous exception in our jurisprudence to the core principle of
just compensation in eminent domain cases, which is that "[t]he
owner is to be put in the same position monetarily as he would
87. 318 F. Supp. 698 (S.D. Tex. 1970) (holding that landowners were not entitled to
value that would have accrued due to diversion or channeling of water, but landowners
should be entitled to value attributable to "passive proximity" to water).
88. Id. at 704.
89. United States v. 8,968.06 Acres of Land, 324 F. Supp. 546 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
90. See 33 U.S.C. § 595a (1994).
91. See infra notes 150-226 and accompanying text (discussing the way in which Sec-
tion 111 altered the rules for determining just compensation in cases where part of the
land's value is attributable to its proximity to a navigable waterway); see also United States v.
Birnbach, 400 F.2d 378 (8th Cir. 1968) (illustrating another example of how the lower courts
have applied Rands).
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have been [in] if his property had not been taken."92 Instead of
requiring the government to pay the landowner the fair market
value of his or her property based on the potential "highest and
best"93 use of the property, Rands permits the government to pay a
riparian landowner what one commentator has bluntly described
as "a truncated and butchered version of market value that limits
the property to certain specific uses and excludes certain other
uses even though the property is completely adaptable for such
other uses.
9 4
The landowners in Rands owned land along the Columbia River
in the State of Oregon9 They leased the land to the State with an
option to purchase at a specified price.96 The federal government
took the land before the option was exercised in connection with a
dam project.9 Pursuant to 33 U.S.C. 578, the government sold the
land to the State of Oregon at "a price considerably less than the
option price ... "98
In the condemnation proceeding, the trial judge determined
that the land had to be valued as if it were not in proximity with
the Columbia River. Specifically, it could only be valued for "sand,
gravel, and agricultural purposes, ' 99 and could not be valued as a
"port site." l00 The Ninth Circuit reversed on the basis that "port site
value should be compensable under the Fifth Amendment."'0 ' As
the court noted, the ultimate just compensation award was ap-
proximately "one-fifth the claimed value of the land if used as a
port site or, in other words, one-fifth of the market value of the
land.
In reversing the Ninth Circuit's ruling, the Supreme Court re-
lied in part on the access cases discussed above (Gibson v. United
92. United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 16 (1970); see also United States v. Va. Elec.
& Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 633 (1961) (describing this rule as the "guiding principle ofjust
compensation").
93. Awarding compensation on the basis of the "highest and best" use of a parcel is
the standard rule. See, e.g., United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 490 (1973).
94. Senate Hearings, supra note 7, at 684 (prepared statement of Harold R. DeMoss,Jr.).
Mr. De Moss's statement contains an outstanding critique of the Rands decision.
95. 389 U.S. at 121-22.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 122.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. (quoting from Rands v. United States, 367 F.2d 186, 191 (9th Cir. 1966)) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
102. Id.
SUMMER 2001]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
States,1 03 Scranton v. Wheeler,'0 4 and United States v. Commodore Park,
Inc.10 5) for the proposition that the United States may "impair or
destroy a riparian owner's access to navigable waters, even though
the market value of the riparian owner's land is substantially di-
minished."'0 6
The Court's reliance on those cases was somewhat dubious,
however, because those cases did not involve actual physical inva-
sions of land, and hence were not actual takings. As noted above,
when viewed against the backdrop of established eminent domain
principles, the holdings in these cases-that governmental regula-
tion causing a loss of riparian access does not amount to a
compensable taking of property-are unexceptional. Contrary to
the Court's dictum in United States v. Virginia Electric & Power
Co.'0 7 (which was cited in Rands), it hardly follows from these hold-
ings that when the government actually takes property, the
landowner is not entitled to the full market value of the property,
including any portion of the value attributable to the property's
access to a waterway.108
In support of its conclusion that the landowners before the
Court were not entitled to compensation for their riparian land,
the Rands Court also cited a case that arose in quite a different
context, United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co. ' 9 In that
case, the government condemned, inter alia, a hydroelectric power
company on the St. Mary's River, a waterway providing the only
103. 166 U.S. 269 (1897).
104. 179 U.S. 141 (1900).
105. 324 U.S. 386 (1945).
106. Rands, 389 U.S. at 123 (citations omitted).
107. 365 U.S. 624, 629 (1961) (indicating that "just as the navigational privilege permits
the Government to reduce the value of riparian lands by denying the riparian owner access
to the stream without compensation for his loss, it also permits the Government to disre-
gard the value arising from this same fact of riparian location in compensating the owner
when fast lands are appropriated") (citations omitted) [cited in Rands, 389 U.S. at 122-23].
In fact, there is no necessary relationship between the rules governing what types of losses
are compensable where there is no physical invasion of land, and which losses are com-
pensable when such an invasion occurs. See, e.g., Alan T. Ackerman & Noah Eliezer Yanich,
Just Compensation and the Framers' Intent: A Constitutional Approach to Road Construction Dam-
ages in Partial Taking Cases, 77 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 241 (2000). In any event, as one
commentator has pointed out, the rather far-reaching statement from Va. Elec. & Power Co.
was mere unsupported dictum, because the flowage easement in that case did not create
"any right of access to navigable waters .... " See Senate Hearings, supra note 7, at 691 (Pre-
pared Statement of Harold De Moss, Jr.).
108. See also Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 834 E2d 1488 (1988) (upholding use of
due process and equal protection theories to support compensation for landowners af-
fected by unreasonable zoning regulations without requiring a showing that the regulations
effectively deprived the landowners of any reasonable use of their property).
109. 229 U.S. 53 (1913).
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outlet for Lake Superior."° The Chandler-Dunbar Water Power
Company (Chandler-Dunbar) owned an upland strip of land ap-
proximately 2500 feet long and from fifty to 150 feet wide, and had
placed dams, dikes, and forebays in the water to harness water
power for commercial purposes."' The federal government con-
demned the land for the purpose of enlarging the "Soo Locks" in
order to better facilitate the passage of vessels between Lake Supe-
rior and Lake Huron. 2 The district court awarded Chandler-
Dunbar not only an amount representing the value of the uplands,
but also an amount representing the value of the water power of
the river "in excess of the supposed requirements of navigation
... .,,113 Chandler-Dunbar had claimed a "proprietary right ... in
the flow of the stream ... to the extent that such flow is in excess
of the wants of navigation ....
The Supreme Court held that because Chandler-Dunbar had
"no property right in the river which has been 'taken,' ,,.. the dis-
trict court "erred in awarding $550,000, or any other sum, for the
value of what is called 'raw water,' that is, the present money value
of the rapids and falls to the Chandler-Dunbar Company as ripar-
ian owners of the shore and appurtenant submerged land."" 6 The
district court had awarded compensation for the value of the up-
lands which included the value attributable to the land's use for
"canal and lock purposes," 7 as well as its value for use as factory
sites for generating power."8 The Supreme Court affirmed the
award insofar as it compensated for the land's use for canals and
locks, but reversed insofar as the award reflected the land's use for
power generation." 9
The Supreme Court's denial of compensation for the "present
money value of the rapids and falls" as used for power generation
is perfectly consistent with settled valuation rules in condemnation
110. Id. at 66.
111. Id. at 68.
112. See id. at 67.
113. Id. at 59.
114. Id. at 61.
115. Id. at 74.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 75.
118. See id. at 74-75 (referring to this portion of the award as representing "additional
value allowed in consequence of the availability of these parcels in connection with the
water power supposed to be the property of the Chandler-Dunbar Company, and supposed
to have been taken by the Government in this case").
119. See id. at 75.
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cases.2 While the potential use of land for operating a particular
business affects the value of land, the effect is generally not meas-
ured-except indirectly (through the introduction of such
evidence for a limited purpose)-by the present value of the ex-
pected stream of profits from business activity that can be engaged
in on the land. In ordinary condemnation settings, compensa-
tion for the value of land would not include a "present value"
compensation for profits arising out of a potential (or actual) use
of the land.'
2
Regarding the award for "additional value allowed in conse-
quence of the availability of these parcels in connection with water
power," it is not entirely clear what this actually represented. A fully
informed buyer would presumably assign some value to a particu-
lar potential use of the land, though the buyer would have to
discount that value by the possibility that such a use would be
barred at some future time.123 If this was the basis of the district
court's reasoning, then it would be difficult to justify the Supreme
Court's refusal to uphold that award.124 In any event, this part of
the Supreme Court's opinion is difficult to explain, because the
Court unanimously affirmed the award of compensation for the
value attributable to the property's use for canals and locks, which
would inherently reflect the value of the probable use of the prop-
erty for that purpose. 25 In light of this statement, one way to
120. See, e.g., Detroit v. Larned Assoc. & Buckland Van-Wald, Inc., 501 N.W.2d 189, 191-
92 (1993).
121. See 4 NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 13.4 (2001).
122. See Morreale, supra note 20, at 48-49. Professor Morreale assumes that the value of
the water flow and the value it added to the adjoining land are identical concepts (and are
therefore identical in dollar value), but this assumption is unsound, since these values may
be significantly different.
123. Of course, that probability must be ascertained without regard to the threat of this
particular condemnation. Cf United States v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 635-36
(1960) (suggesting that value of flowage easement being condemned is to be determined by
"probability or improbability of actual exercise of the easement" and that "in assessing this
improbability, no weight should be given to the prospect of governmental appropriation").
124. See Chandler-Dunbar, 229 U.S. at 76. Zoning presents analogies to the navigational
servitude insofar as zoning changes can transform an impermissible use into a permissible
(and hence "potential") use, and vice versa. Under settled condemnation law principles, the
landowner is entitled to compensation for uses that are compatible with reasonably possible
or probable zoning changes, though the value attributable to that use should be discounted
by the probability that the zoning change will not occur. See, e.g., Mackie v. Eilender, 108
N.W.2d 755, 756 (Mich. 1961).
125. With respect to the portion of the award based on "the availability of these parcels
of land for lock and canal purposes," the Court said:
That this land had a prospective value for the purpose of constructing a canal and
lock parallel with those in use had passed beyond the region of the purely conjec-
tural or speculative. That one or more additional parallel canals and locks would be
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reconcile the Court's reversal of the award based on "availability"
for power generation purposes with its affirmance of the award
based on "availability" for lock and canal purposes is to assume
that the Court concluded that one use was reasonably probable
while the other was not."26 As such, the Rands Court's reliance on
Chandler-Dunbar provides only a tenuous basis for its broad ruling
regarding the compensation to which riparian landowners are
constitutionally entitled.
The Rands Court's reliance on United States v. Twin City Power
Co.27 seems much more sensible, although that case was decided
by a narrow 5 to 4 majority"2 and is itself at odds with longstanding
valuation rules in condemnation cases. In Twin City Power, the
United States condemned land owned by a power company for the
purpose, inter alia, of hydroelectric power generation."" The land-
owner, Twin City Power Company, had not constructed (and was
not operating) a hydroelectric plant on its land or the adjoining
waterway (the Savannah River) .30
In the condemnation proceeding, the commissioners found that
the value of the land as a potential site for hydroelectric power op-
erations was $267.02 per acre.13 They also found that "for
agricultural purposes or as wild forest land, without reference to
their availability for development of water power, the lands would
have had a value of around $37 per acre. 1 32 The district court
awarded the higher amount, and the government appealed, argu-
ing that "'the value of land as a potential power site on a navigable
stream is not an element of just compensation under the Fifth
needed to meet the increasing demands of lake traffic was an immediate probability
.... Although it is not proper to estimate land condemned for public purposes by
the public necessities or its worth to the public for such purpose, it is proper to con-
sider the fact that the property is so situated that it will probably be desired and
available for such a purpose.
Chandler-Dunbar, 229 U.S. at 76-77.
126. See United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 245 (1956) (Burton,J., dissent-
ing) (suggesting that the Chandler-Dunbar Court's "rejection [of value based on potential use
for power generation] ... was due to the speculative nature of the proposed use... .
127. 350 U.S. 222 (1956).
128. Justice Douglas delivered an opinion joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justices
Black, Reed, and Clark, while Justices Frankfurter, Minton, and Harlan joined Justice Bar-
ton's dissenting opinion.
129. Twin City Power, 350 U.S. at 223.
130. Id. at 227.
131. United States v. Twin City Power Co., 215 E2d 592, 594 (4th Cir. 1954).
132. Id.
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Amendment.' ,13' The Fourth Circuit rejected this contention, and
affirmed the lower court's award ofjust compensation.
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the case
was controlled by the Court's decision in Chandler-Dunbar. Accord-
ing to the Court, the landowners in Twin City Power obtained the
same kind of compensation that the Court rejected in Chandler-
Dunbar.3 4 As such, the Court agreed with the government's conten-
tion that the power company was not entitled to any compensation
for its potential use as a site for hydroelectric power generation.
The Twin City Power Court's reliance on Chandler-Dunbar is un-
sound for a number of the same reasons referenced above. First,
there is a logical distinction between the "present money value" of
a potential land use, and the increment of additional value that the
potential use confers on the market value of the land. These are
different economic concepts, and there is no reason to expect the
dollar values associated with each to be the same. Contrary to the
Court's assertion, the district court in Twin City Power did not award
the "present money value" of the use of the land for hydroelectric
operations, but instead awarded the full market value of the land,
some of which was attributable to its potential use as a site for a
hydroelectric operation. 
5
Furthermore, and as Justice Burton suggested in his dissenting
opinion in Twin City Power, the Chandler-Dunbar Court's affirmance
of the portion of the award which included the value of the land
based on its use for canals and locks is consistent with the view that
the land in Twin City Power was properly valued for its potential use
as a site for hydroelectric power generation. 36
The majority also asserted that a compensation award predi-
cated on the potential use of the land for power generation would
have violated the eminent domain rule that the "special value [of
133. Id. (citation omitted).
134. 350 U.S. at 226.
135. Id. at 237 (quoting Commissioner's Report for the proposition that "the award to
Twin City of $1,257,033.20 is not the value of its property for any particular purpose but
represents the fair market value after considering all of the reasonable uses of the property
which were not too remote or speculative ... .") (Burton, J., dissenting); see also id. at 241
(acknowledging correctness of Chandler-Dunbar Court's denial of compensation for "water
power rights") (Burton,J, dissenting).
136. 350 U.S. at 241-42 (Burton, J., dissenting). The Twin City Power majority's attempt
to distinguish this aspect of the holding in Chandler-Dunbar is unpersuasive. In a footnote,
the opinion suggests that the Court in Chandler-Dunbar may have been "influenced by the
fact that, on the special facts of the case, the use of the land for canals and locks was wholly
consistent with the dominant navigation servitude of the United States and indeed aided
navigation." 350 U.S. at 227 n. 1. The Court did not explain why land should be valued on
the basis of a potential use which aids navigation, but not on the basis of other potential
uses of the land not related to navigation.
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land] to the condemnor as distinguished from others who may or
may not possess the power to condemn, must be excluded as an
element of market value." 1 37 That argument is fallacious because it
assumes that the demand for land suitable for hydroelectric power
generation is exclusively a governmental demand, when in fact the
needs of power generation companies also stimulate a private de-
mand for such land. In fact, the courts in one jurisdiction have
held that where a particular "highest and best use" for a property
can be carried out by either the government or by private entities,
the property should be valued according to that use.
1 38
If anything, it is the majority opinion in Twin City Power that ap-
pears to be inconsistent with the rule that property is to be valued
as if there had been no condemnation, and without regard to any
depreciating effects of the condemnation. By effectively requiring
that the land in Twin City Power be valued as if it had no potential
use as a site for power generation,'39 the Twin City Power Court was,
in effect, using the fact of the condemnation to diminish the value
of the land, insofar as the condemnation destroyed any possibility
that the power company could use the land for power generation
140purposes.
Alternatively, the Twin City Power Court may have been saying
that compensation need not be paid for a use which Congress
might preclude in the future. But as the dissenting opinion in Twin
City Power suggested, the government cannot be "excused from
paying just compensation measured by the value of the property at
the time of taking merely because it could destroy that value by
appropriate legislation or regulation." 4' It also ignores the eco-
nomic reality that regardless of whether the government has the
power to preclude a particular use (or to condemn), the market
value for the land would reflect that potential use, 42 discounted by
the possibility that the government would take such action.
137. Id. at 228 (quoting United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 375 (1942)).
138. County of San Diego v. Rancho Vista Del Mar, Inc., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 675, 684
(1993); see also Ventura County Flood Control Dist. v. Campbell, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 725 (1999),
as modified on denial of rehearing, review denied (July 14, 1999) (applying the foregoing rule).
139. See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
140. Twin City Power, 350 U.S. at 227.
141. Id. at 240 (Burton,J., dissenting) (quoting from United States ex rel. TV.A. v. Pow-
elson, 319 U.S. 266 (1943)). Harold R. De Moss,Jr. made the same point with respect to the
Rands decision in the Statement provided to the Senate in 1970. See Senate Hearings, supra
note 7, at 683.
142. See 350 U.S. at 237 ("We cannot realistically imagine that such a negotiation [to
purchase the property] would have been limited to a consideration of the land's timber and
its minor value for agricultural uses.") (Burton,J, dissenting).
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The logical and doctrinal shortcomings of the Twin City Power
opinion necessarily infect the Rands decision, which relied heavily
on Twin City Power to carve out a broad rule that precludes a con-
demnation jury from taking into account the value attributable to
a riparian location in determining just compensation. 143 Quite
apart from these defects, Rands is grossly unfair to riparian land-
owners by treating them differently than virtually all other
landowners in eminent domain proceedings. '44 Waterfront prop-
erty is often substantially more valuable than non-waterfront
property, and excluding the value attributable to a waterfront loca-
tion in a condemnation proceeding is obviously unjust to a
landowner who paid for that value when he or she acquired the
property. It seems impossible to square the Rands rule with the
purpose of the Just Compensation Clause, which is to bar the gov-
ernment "from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as
a whole.1
45
A subsequent case illustrates how the rule in Rands departs from
traditional eminent domain principles. In United States v. Rey-
nolds,'4  the Court considered the issue of whether the
condemnation of a landowner's property was within the scope of a
reservoir project that had been started years earlier. When the pro-
ject was announced, the property did not adjoin a waterway; but
the project for which the condemnation was undertaken created a
waterway alongside the property at issue.14' Later, the government
decided to condemn that property, and the issue was whether it
should be valued as riparian land, or as non-riparian land. The
Court noted that "[t]he parties agree that if the acreage in issue
was 'probably within the scope of the project from the time the
Government was committed to it,' substantially less compensation
is due than if it was not."148 The Court then articulated that differ-
ence as follows:
[I]f the property was probably within the project's original
scope, then its compensable value is to be measured in terms
of agricultural use. If, on the other hand, the acreage was out-
143. SeeUnited States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 123-26 (1967).
144. See e.g. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373 (1943) ("The owner is to be put in
as good [a] position pecuniarily as he would have occupied if his property had not been
taken."). This rule has been described by the Supreme Court as the "guiding principle of
just compensation." United States v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 633 (1961).
145. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
146. 397 U.S. 14 (1970).
147. Id. at 14-15.
148. Id. at 18.
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side the original scope of the project, its compensable value is
properly measurable in terms of its economic potential as
lakeside residential or recreational property.
1
4
9
The Reynolds Court was stating a truism when it observed that
the value of the property as waterfront property would be greater
than its value as non-waterfront property. Yet under the rule an-
nounced in Rands a few years earlier, the value attributable to
proximity to a navigable waterway should have been excluded in
determining just compensation. In light of the strangeness of the
Rands rule, however, it is perhaps understandable that the parties in
Reynolds (and, apparently, the Court) overlooked its applicability.
There is another possible way to reconcile the Reynolds analysis
with the Rands rule. The rule in Rands is based on the notion that
Congress should not have to pay for the riparian value of land it
condemns because it has the independent power to destroy that
riparian value under the navigational servitude doctrine. But the
navigational servitude can only be invoked as a defense if two con-
ditions are met: the regulation in question is within Congress'
power to regulate interstate commerce and the regulation serves a
navigational purpose. Because it is presumably more difficult for
both conditions to be met with respect to an inland lake wholly
within the borders of one state, the logical basis for the Rands rule
may be absent in a situation like Reynolds.
In summary, after Rands, the navigational servitude presented
numerous potential problems for landowners. Buildings built on
land filled in beyond the 1794 harbor line were subject to uncom-
pensated seizures. Even land on small non-navigable streams could
be deemed subject to the servitude on the theory that the streams
flowed into navigable waters. And most significantly, the govern-
ment could seize such property without fully compensating
landowners for its value.
Because the Supreme Court was indifferent to the plight of ri-
parian landowners, congressional action was necessary. In a
dramatic illustration of its power to address injustice where the
Court deemed itself powerless to do so, Congress acted.
149. Id.
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III. CONGRESS PROVIDES LEGISLATIVE RELIEF
FROM THE RANDS RULE
The rule announced by the Supreme Court in Rands limited the
government's constitutional obligation to reimburse riparian
landowners for the true value of their property in condemnation
actions. It did not, however, preclude Congress from providing, as
a matter of legislative grace, for the recovery of the very elements
of compensation that the Court had excluded from the reach of
the Fifth Amendment.Y° Congress apparently had been willing to
live with the Court's decision in Twin City Power, so long as that
case was confined to its narrow facts. But when the Rands Court
made it clear that Twin City Power would not be limited in this fash-
ion, and instead carved out a broad exception to the generally
applicable rules for determining compensation in condemnations
of land on or near waterways, Congress took action almost imme-
diately.
Within two years of the decision, Congress began to consider
statutory reforms to ameliorate the harshness of the Rands deci-
sion, and to bring the rules regarding just compensation in
riparian condemnation cases into conformity with those that ap-
plied in non-riparian contexts. A bill seeking to institute such a
reform was introduced in 1969, but quickly died in Committee. 
52
In May, 1970, the House and Senate introduced identical reform
bills, each of which died in committee following hearings. 153 On
December 3, 1970, the House introduced another reform bill
which ultimately became Section 111 of the Rivers and Harbors
Act.14 Before it became law, however, the Senate rejected theHouse bill and substituted a very weak bill which would have sim-
150. See, e.g., United States v. 30.54 Acres of Land, 90 E3d 790, 794 (3rd Cir. 1996)
("Congress can, of course, provide relief where the exercise of the navigational servitude
causes economic loss, even though the United States is not constitutionally required to pay
compensation.").
151. It is admittedly a bit of an oversimplification to suggest that Rands only applies to
riparian landowners, and hence that the statutory relief provided by Congress was only
directed at such owners. For in theory, the Rands decision would relieve the government of
the obligation to pay for any element of value attributable to a parcel's proximity to a water-
way, even if it does not actually abut a waterway. See Brittain, supra note 9, at 521.
152. See id. at 510. The full text of the bill is reproduced in an appendix to the Brittain
comment at p. 543. The bill was arguably more favorable to riparian landowners than the
bill that was eventually passed, because it contained no exception for partial takings.
153. Id. at 510. The bill introduced by both Houses of Congress is reproduced in an
appendix to the Brittain comment at pp. 543-44. Similarly, this bill contained no exception
for partial takings.
154. 33 U.S.C. § 595a (1994).
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ply authorized the Secretary of the Army to conduct a study of the
155
effects of the navigational servitude. The two bills went into con-
ference for resolution, and the Conference Report adopted the
House bill in place of the Senate bill. 56 On December 31, 1970,
the bill was enacted into law. 57 Neither the Senate nor the House
held hearings on the bill that was enacted into law or on the Sen-
ate bill that was rejected in conference. 58
As written, Section 111 consists of two principal parts. The first
part describes the rule for determining just compensation with re-
spect to any real property lying above the high water mark of a
waterway that is taken by the United States "in connection with any
improvement of rivers, harbors, canals, or waterways of the United
States ... ,'., It unmistakably provides that, notwithstanding
Rands, when property above the high water mark is condemned
for any of several specified purposes, the landowner is entitled to
full compensation for the part taken, including compensation for
any value attributable to the property's access to or use of naviga-
ble waters.
In all cases where real property shall be taken by the United
States for the public use in connection with any improvement
of rivers, harbors, canals, or waterways of the United States,
and in all condemnation proceedings by the United States to
acquire lands or easements for such improvements, the com-
pensation to be paid for real property taken by the United
States above the normal high water mark of navigable waters
of the United States shall be the fair market value of such real
property based upon all uses to which such real property may
reasonably be put, including its highest and best use, any of
which uses may be dependent upon access to or utilization of
such navigable waters.160
There is one significant respect in which the traditional rule for
determining just compensation remains inapplicable to riparian
condemnations, and it is set forth in the second part of Section
111. Outside of the riparian context, the general rule regarding
155. See Brittain, supra note 9, at 510. The text of that bill is also reproduced in an ap-
pendix to the Brittain comment, at p. 544.
156. Id. at 511.
157. Id.
158. Id. at510.
159. 33 U.S.C. § 595a (1994).
160. Id.
SUMMER 2001 ]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
compensation in a partial taking case is that the landowner is con-
stitutionally entitled to compensation for the value of the part
taken plus "the incidental injury or benefit to the part not taken"
(i.e., the "severance damage") that results from the condemna-
tion.16 Analytically, the total amount of just compensation in a
partial taking case could be computed by adding the fair market
value of the part taken to the injury to the remainder. But the
usual formula for determining compensation in a partial taking
case is to compute the difference between the fair market value of
the entire parcel before the taking and the fair market value of the
remainder after the taking.1 62 While this "before and after" formula
is arithmetically and functionally equivalent to the other approach,
its ease of application makes it the preferred approach. In short, it
involves fewer mathematical calculations, and thus is easier for ju-
rors to apply.
In contrast, the second part of Section 111 provides that in a
partial taking case, severance damages to a remainder parcel re-
sulting from "loss of or reductions of access from such remaining
real property to... navigable waters" will not be recoverable:
In cases of partial takings of real property, no depreciation in
the value of any remaining real property shall be recognized
and no compensation shall be paid for any damages to such
remaining real property which result from loss of or reduc-
tion of access from such remaining real property to such
navigable waters because of the taking of real property or the
purposes for which such real property is taken.
6 3
This portion of Section 111 thus carves out an exception to the
traditional eminent domain rule allowing severance damages to
the remainder, by providing that no severance damages attribut-
able to lost or reduced access to a waterway will be recoverable.
Section 111 has been described by two federal courts as having
"legislatively set[] aside Rands and its predecessors,"'64 as having "in
essence abrogate[d] the doctrine of non-compensation for ripar-
161. Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 574-75 (1897). This rule for determining compensa-
tion in partial taking cases has been recited in numerous federal cases since then. See, e.g.,
United States v. 33.5 Acres, 789 E2d 1396, 1398 (9th Cir. 1986) (indicating that in a partial
taking case, the landowner is entitled to compensation "both for that which is physically
appropriated and for the diminution in value to the non-condemned property").
162. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 376 (1943).
163. 33 U.S.C. § 595a. The two sentences quoted above comprise all of the substantive
provisions of Section 111. There is a third sentence, not quoted above, which sets forth the
effective date of the Section.
164. United States v. 8.968.06 Acres of Land, 326 E Supp. 546, 547 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
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ian access found in ... Rands ... ,"65 and as having "repealed"'
the "rule of Rands.'' 167 This is not quite accurate, even as to the first
part of Section 111, because Congress cannot "abrogate" or "set
aside" or "repeal" a decision of the Court regarding the govern-
ment's obligations under the Just Compensation Clause. A more
precise characterization of the first part of Section 111 is that it
provided by legislative grace some of the compensation rights
which the Court in Rands held that the Constitution did not com-
pel Congress to provide.' 68 In any event, the practical effect of
Section 11 1 is that, at least with respect to property actually taken,
compensation will be paid in accordance with the usual constitu-
tional rules regarding just compensation, and not in accordance
with the rules announced in Twin City Power and Rands. As such,
the just compensation paid to landowners should include any
component of value attributable to their property's proximity to a
navigable waterway. 69 With respect to total (as opposed to partial)
takings, the implementation of Section 111 in determining value
has been described as "fairly straightforward and unambiguous."
70
The second part of Section I 11 creates a "caveat" 71 or qualifica-
tion to the first section insofar as it provides, in effect, that
165. United States v. 13.20 Acres of Land, 629 F. Supp. 242, 247 (E.D. Wash. 1986).
166. United States v. 967,905 Acres of Land, 447 F2d 764, 770 (8th Cir. 1971).
167. Id.
168. See United States v. 320.0 Acres of Land, 605 E2d 762, 784 n. 27 (5th Cir. 1979)
(indicating, in reference to Section 111, that although decisions of the Court "firmly estab-
lish that the Constitution does not require compensation for value inherent in condemned
riparian fast lands by virtue of their access to navigable waters, Congress has nonetheless
decided legislatively to award that element of fair market value denied judicially in Rands and
its predecessors") (emphasis in original).
169. Thus, while the Rands rule is still a part of our constitutional jurisprudence, its
importance has been greatly reduced in light of the passage of Section 111. Indeed, in cases
involving complete (rather than partial) takings of property above the high water mark,
Rands is in practical terms an irrelevancy. Curiously, despite the crucial importance of Sec-
tion 111 to riparian takings, the lengthy discussion of the Rands rule by the Supreme Court
in Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979), made no reference to Section 111.
170. UNIFORM APPRAISAL STANDARDS FOR FEDERAL LAND ACQUISITIONs 45 (1992).
171. United States v. 13.20 Acres, 629 ESupp. 242, 247 (E.D. Wash. 1986). The Court in
13.20 Acres invoked Section 111 only in connection with its analysis of compensation for the
remainder parcel. Id. It concluded correctly that under this section, "no severance damages
may be awarded for loss of access from the remaining lands to the water." Id. In ruling that
just compensation for the parcel taken "must be measured by current market value of the
property, taking into consideration the value as enhanced by the proximity of [the lake],"
id. at 246-47, the Court cited only United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 492 (1973), and made
no reference to Section 111. Presumably, the district court was relying on the Fuller Court's
statement that "[i]n United States v. Miller, supra, the Court held that 'just compensation' did
include the increment of value resulting from the completed project to neighboring lands
originally outside the project limits, but later brought within them." 409 U.S. at 492. What
the district court was alluding to here was the "scope of the project rule." Under this rule, if
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compensation for damage to the remainder will continue to be
paid in accordance with the rule set forth in Rands.12 This means
that the "before and after" method of determining just compensa-
tion in the typical partial taking case cannot be used in cases
involving property on or near a waterway. Instead, the approach
recommended by the Uniform Appraisal Standards for Federal
Land Acquisitions Regarding Navigational Servitudes, which are
followed by most appraisers in this context, is "to separately value
the portion of the property taken and separately assess the depre-
ciation, if any, in the value of the remaining property resulting
from the taking, and add the two for total just compensation." 173 In
this situation, the before-and-after rule would not represent an ac-
curate calculation, because it would yield a damage figure
reflecting the loss of riparian value. These standards also say that
in determining the depreciation to the remainder, no depreciation
"which results from loss of or reduction of access.., to the naviga-
ble waters because of the taking of the subject property or the
purposes for which the property is taken" shall be taken into ac-
174
count.
The legislative history of Section 111 is effectively nonexistent.
There were no hearings on the bill that became Section 111, and
there was no floor debate on the bill. The Conference Report to
the Rivers and Harbors and Flood Control Acts of 1970 contains
two paragraphs regarding Section 111. The Report summarizes
almost verbatim the substance of the House bill that became Sec-
a condemnation is within the scope of the original project, then the government is not
obligated to compensate for any increase in the value of the land attributable to the project
itself. 13.20 Acres, 629 E Supp. at 243-44. If, however, a subsequent condemnation is deemed
to be outside the scope of the original project, then the government must compensate for
any increase in the value of that land attributable to the project. In 13.20 Acres, the court
concluded that the subject property was not within the scope of the original project to cre-
ate a reservoir, and hence that the government was required to pay for the increase in value
attributable to the property's proximity to the reservoir which the government had created
before the condemnation. Id. at 246-47. But under the broad rule of Rands, it would seem
that even if the condemnation is outside the scope of the original project, the government
would nevertheless be under no constitutional obligation to compensate for any element of
value attributable to the project's proximity to the waterway. From an analytical standpoint,
the district court should, therefore, have cited Section 111 (as well as Fuller) in order to
justify its ruling with respect to the parcel that was taken.
172. See United States v. 30.54 Acres of Land, 90 F.3d 790, 796 n. 4 (3rd Cir. 1996)
("[T] he second sentence of Section 111 unequivocally states that severance damages are
unavailable.").
173. UNIFORM APPRAISAL STANDARDS FOR FEDERAL LAND ACQUISITIONS 46 (1992).
These standards also provide that the depreciation, if any, in the remainder may be deter-
mined by ascertaining "the difference in market value of the residue before and after taking
.... " except that the "before value" of the remainder "shall not be based on any highest and
best use that is dependent upon access to or utilization of the navigable waters." Id.
174. Id.
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tion 111 and notes without explanation that the conference de-
cided to retain the House bill instead of the Senate bill. The only
statement of any real significance in the Conference Report about
Section 111 is as follows:
The Conferees wish to stress for purposes of clarification that
any decrease or increase in the fair market value of real prop-
erty prior to the date of valuation caused by the public
improvement for which such property is acquired, or by the
likelihood that the property would be acquired for such im-
provement, other than that due to physical deterioration
within the reasonable control of the owner, will be disre-
garded in determining the compensation for the property.175
This is a restatement of a fundamental constitutional rule that
has been applicable to eminent domain cases for many years. 176 If
the government's initiation of a condemnation action has the ef-
fect of depressing or enhancing the value of the property being
taken, those effects should be disregarded for purposes of deter-
mining just compensation. The Conference Report may have
set forth this rule here because, as Congress had been told earlier,
the Rands holding contravenes this well-established rule. 177 Insist-
ing on adherence to this basic rule of takings jurisprudence when
land on or near a waterway is condemned is another way of saying
that the Rands approach to just compensation should not be fol-
lowed in such cases. Another explanation is suggested by the
phrase "prior to the date of valuation." The mere announcement
of a project may often be enough to cause a decrease (or an in-
crease) in the value of property that is later made the subject of an
eminent domain proceeding.78 The conferees may have wanted to
foreclose the possibility that the government might attempt to cir-
cumvent Section 111 by arguing that the value on the date of
taking is controlling, even if that value has been diminished by the
announcement of a project or by other pre-taking activities under-
taken in connection with the project.
175. H.R. CONF. REp. No. 1782,'at 23 (1970).
176. See, e.g., United States v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 633 (1961).
177. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text; see Senate Hearings, supra note 7, at
684 (prepared statement of Harold R. DeMoss,Jr.).
178. See United States v. 8,968.06 Acres of Land, 326 F. Supp. 546, 549 (S.D. Tex. 1971)
(stating that effects of pre-taking activities that inform the public of the impending occur-
rence of a taking, including "discussion, planning, authorization [and] funding," must be
disregarded in determining market value).
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The other relevant legislative history is contained in the House
Report regarding the Rivers and Harbors and Flood Control Acts
of 1970.179 Since the House bill was enacted into law as Section 111
without change, the brief commentary in the Report regarding
that bill is pertinent. After a straightforward summary of the bill
which is virtually identical to the language of the Conference Re-
port, the House Report makes the following substantive comments
about pre-existing law:
Under existing law, when riparian property adjacent to a
navigable waterway is acquired by the United States for a wa-
ter resource development project, the valuation of the
property taken does not include any use of that property as-
sociated with access to and use of the waterway. However,
when only a partial taking occurs, and some property remains
adjacent to the waterway, there is deducted from the just
compensation that would otherwise be paid the value of spe-
cial benefits accuring [sic] to the remaining real property
because of its access to or use of the waterway.180
The Report then goes on to suggest that this is an "inequitable"
result, and explains how the bill would alter it:
The Committee feels that this is an inequitable situation. The
section accordingly provides for the valuation of the real
property taken based upon its access to or use of the naviga-
ble waterway when, in fact, the use to which such property
may reasonably be put is dependent upon such access to or
utilization of the navigable water. This section makes no
change in existing law with respect to the offsetting of special
benefits to remaining real property against the just compen-
sation that would otherwise be paid for the real property
taken and for damages to remaining real property resulting
[from] the taking and the purpose for which the real prop-
erty is taken.1
8
'
The most important part of this excerpt from the Report is the
final sentence. Another section of the Rivers and Harbors Act al-
ready provided that benefits to the remainder are to be offset
against the just compensation to be paid for the property taken.8 2
179. H.R. REP. No. 91-1665, at 31 (1970).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act § 6, 33 U.S.C. § 595 (1994).
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The Report confirms that Section 111 is not intended to alter the
existing rule authorizing offsets.13 By indicating broadly that dam-
ages to the remainder "resulting from the taking" are to be
governed by existing law, the House Report could be read to mean
that no severance damages whatsoever should be recoverable in
takings that fall within the scope of Section 111. The text of the
statute is far narrower, however, insofar as it provides that "no
compensation shall be paid for any damages to such remaining
real property which result from loss of or reduction of access from such
remaining real property to such navigable waters because of the taking
of real property or the purposes for which such real property is
taken."18 4 Thus, it is clear that severance damages are generally
available to remainder property in takings governed by Section
111, but that no severance damages attributable to "loss of or re-
duction of access" to a navigable waterway will be recoverable.
The Conference Report and the House Report state that Section
111 applies "when the United States acquires real property above
the normal high water mark of the navigable waters of the United
States .... ,185 The statute applies somewhat more broadly to "real
property taken by the United States above the normal high water
mark of navigable waters of the United States .. .,16 As such, Sec-
tion 1 11 does not alter the "rule of no compensation" with respect
to real property or structures below the high water mark.18
Only a handful of reported cases have applied Section 111,188 and
only two of those have involved anything other than straightforward
183. The Court held many years ago in Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 574-75 (1897),
that the Fifth Amendment permits the government in partial taking cases to offset the just
compensation due for the property taken by any increases in value to the remaining parcel
that result from the condemnation. See also 33 U.S.C. § 595 (1994) (authorizing offsets of
this kind involving riparian takings).
184. 33 U.S.C. § 595a (1994) (emphasis added).
185. H.R. CONF. REp. No. 1782, at 23 (1970); H.R. REP. No. 91-1665, at 30 (1970).
186. 33 U.S.C. § 595a (1994)(emphasis added). This distinction in terminology may
have implications regarding an important issue of statutory construction involving Section
111. See supra notes 161-74, and accompanying text.
187. See Brittain, supra note 9, at 519-20, 534-35 (drawing the same conclusion); see also
supra notes 30-68 and accompanying text (discussing the rule of no compensation that
derives from the navigational servitude). If a taking included property both below and
above the high water mark, Section 111 would govern the just compensation to be paid only
with respect to property lying above the high water mark.
188. United States v. 30.54 Acres of Land, 90 F.3d 790, 792-96 (3rd Cir. 1996); United
States v. 967,905 Acres of Land, 447 F.2d 764, 770-71 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
974 (1972); United States v. 13.20 Acres of Land, 629 F. Supp. 242, 247 (E.D. Wash. 1986);
United States v, 71.29 Acres of Land, 376 F. Supp. 1221, 1225-26 (W.D. La. 1974); United
States v. 8,968.06 Acres of Land, 326 F. Supp. 546, 547-48 (S.D. Tex. 1971); Palm Beach Isles
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applications of that section. 8 9 In United States v. 967,905 Acres of
Land, the federal government exercised its power of eminent do-
main to acquire private land in Minnesota to create a wilderness
area in which commercial activities would be prohibited.' 90 The
land in question bordered a navigable lake, and for many years the
landowners had operated a fishing and hunting resort on the land
which made use of the lake.' 9' The government argued that the
language in Section 111 which referred to the "'improvement[]'
of rivers, harbors, canals, and waterways" meant that the section
only applied to takings effected for "'conventional' improvements
such as the construction of locks and dams and projects for bank
stabilization or for the stabilization or deepening of the channels
of navigable streams. 092
In rejecting that construction of Section 111, the court noted
that the "interests" that the navigation power is intended to serve
are "not limited to the promotion and fostering of trade and
commerce along and upon our waterways or to the control or pre-
vention of destructive floods.' 93 The court said that "[t]hey
include ... those interests which are aesthetic, ecological, and en-
vironmental as well as those which are economic and
commercial."' 94 Accordingly, it construed Section 111 to apply to
the taking of the land alongside the lake for the creation of a wil-
derness area:
We think that the Congress and the Executive Branch of the
Government may properly conclude that the encroachment
of civilization and commercial enterprise upon a wilderness
area and the navigable waters found therein militates against
the broad public interests that have been mentioned, and that
when the Government commands civilization and business to
retreat from a given area so that it may be preserved in its
natural state for the enjoyment and refreshment of all of us, it
may fairly be said that the Government is acting to "improve"
the area and the waterways therein. We so hold. 1
95
Assocs. v. United States, 42 Fed. CI. Claims 340, 352-53 (1998), rev'd, 208 F.2d 1374 (Fed. Cir.
2000).
189. 30.54 Acres, 90 F.3d at 792-96; 967.905 Acres, 447 F.2d at 770-71.
190. 447 F.2d 764, 766 (8th Cir. 1971).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 771.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
[VOL. 34:4
just and Unjust Compensation
The upshot of the court's construction of Section 111 was that the
land's "access to the Lake [was] to be taken into consideration in
fixing [its] value"' 96 in the eminent domain proceeding. This seems
to be a reasonable reading of Section 111.'9'
In United States v. 30.54 Acres of Land, the Third Circuit consid-
ered another issue regarding the construction of Section l11-
namely, whether a "taking" of real property under the statute en-
compasses only direct appropriations of land (through formal
condemnation proceedings) or whether it also encompasses so-
called regulatory takings. 19 In 30.54 Acres, the government con-
demned a portion of a 132.55-acre tract of land in Pennsylvania in
connection with a project to create a lock and dam on the Monon-
gahela River. 99 The landowners had a coal-loading facility on the
remainder property as well as a tipple, which is an apparatus used
for emptying coal from a car by tipping it. 2°° The tipple was
grounded on property above the high water mark of the Monon-
gahela River, but it extended approximately 100 feet into the
river . 2 Although the government did not acquire the property on
which the coal-loading facility was located and on which the tipple
202
was grounded, it did issue an order prohibiting their operation.
In support of this prohibition, the government indicated that be-
cause of its close proximity to the lock and dam, the operation of
the coal-loading facility would pose a "'safety hazard' "to riverboat
pilots and a "'hazard"' to the operation of the lock and dam.0
The landowners did not contend that the government failed to
comply with Section 111 in paying just compensation for the 30.54
196. Id.
197. The court in 967,905 Acres mentioned the statutes pursuant to which the condem-
nation was undertaken, id. at 765 n. 1, but did not indicate whether any of those statutes
made reference to congressional power over navigable waterways. Congress' power over
navigable waterways undoubtedly includes the power to prohibit watercraft or other vessels
from using those waters. At least to that extent, the taking in 967,905 Acres would appear to
represent an exercise of Congress' powers to regulate navigable waterways, even though the
taking primarily served the much broader interests identified in the court's opinion. One
could argue, however, that these broader interests are of such a nature as to render the
taking in 967,905 Acres an exercise of the Commerce power that does not implicate Con-
gress' power to regulate navigable waterways. If that were the correct characterization, then
it would appear that the Rands rule would not apply to the taking at all, and therefore that
resort to Section 111 to obtain compensation for that element of value attributable to the
land's proximity to the waterway would be unnecessary.
198. 90 E3d 790 (3rd Cir. 1996).
199. Id. at 792.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 792-93.
203. See id. at 793 (citations omitted).
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acres taken, but they did argue that the government had not done
so with respect to the remainder parcel. ° 4 In Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council,205 the Supreme Court held that regulation of prop-
erty can amount to a per se taking for Fifth Amendment purposes
in those cases where it deprives the owner of "all economically
beneficial uses in the name of the common good."20 6 In such a
case, the government may enforce the regulation, but it must pay
just compensation if it does. The landowners in 30.54 Acres main-
tained that the "prohibition on the use of the tipple and coal
loading facility stripped the 102 acres remaining in their posses-
sion of all economically reasonable uses," and, as such, amounted
to a regulatory taking of the remainder parcel.0 7 They further ar-
gued that Section 111 rendered this regulatory taking
compensable because the property had been "taken" within the
meaning of that section, thereby precluding application of the
navigational servitude. 20 8 The district court ruled that the landown-
ers were entitled to no compensation for any economic loss
traceable to the regulation. 2 9 The Third Circuit affirmed. The
court first observed that the Lucas case itself had cited the govern-
ment's power to create a permanent easement under the
navigational servitude doctrine as "a pre-existing limitation upon
the landowner's title," which is not compensable under the Fifth
Amendment. 21 As such the Third Circuit said there was no "tak-ing" of the remainder parcel in the constitutional sense.2 ' The
204. See id. at 796 n.4.
205. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
206. Id. at 1019 (emphasis in original); see also supra note 75.
207. 90 E3d at 795. What is not clear from the facts of 30.54 Acres as recited by the court
is whether the landowners were prohibited from operating the coal-loading facility and
tipple anywhere on the 102-acre remainder parcel, or just in one particular location. If the
government's order allowed for the possibility of relocating the facility and tipple and oper-
ating it somewhere else on the remainder parcel, then it would seem almost impossible for
the landowners to prove that they had been deprived of all beneficial or productive use of
that parcel.
208. The landowners in 30.54 Acres did not argue that the prohibition on the use of the
loading facility and tipple was compensable as a form of severance damage to the remain-
der. See 90 F.3d at 796, n.4. As the court noted, such an argument would have been
foreclosed by the second part of Section 111, which "unequivocally" precludes recovery for
severance damages resulting from loss or reduction of access to a navigable waterway. Id.
209. Id. at 793.
210. 30.54 Acres, 90 F.3d 790 at 795.
211. The court said that the "[e]xercise of the servitude did nothing more than realize
a limitation always inherent in the landowners' title. It was not a taking." Id. The Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit expressed essentially the same idea, but in different words,
when it held that the United States government may invoke "the federal navigational servi-
tude as a defense against a regulatory takings claim." Palm Beach Isles Associates v. United
States, 208 E3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000). See supra text at notes 47-63 for a discussion of the
Palm Beach Isles case.
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court noted that "[t]here is no reason to suppose that Congress
referred to takings in Section 111 in any other than a constitu-
tional sense."212 It then observed that the statutory phrase "real
property taken by the United States above the high water mark"
could in no event be read to cover a prohibition on the use of a
structure (the tipple) that jutted 100 feet out into a waterway that
was unaccompanied by the taking of any land other than the 30.54
213
acres.
Finally, the court held that Congress "did not express an intent
to abolish the navigational servitude or to provide compensation
for all economic losses occasioned by regulation of navigable wa-
terways. " 2 14 Its intent, the court said, was "to modify the rule of...
Rands only to the extent of paying full compensation based on ri-
parian location in cases of actual acquisition of above the high-
water mark real property.,
2 15
Both the court's analysis and its holding in 30.54 Acres are open
to serious question. First, the court seemed to blur two distinct
questions: (1) what constitutes a regulatory taking and (2) what
kinds of damages are payable to a riparian landowner whose land
has been subjected to a regulatory taking? Section 111 is relevant
to the second issue, but does not seem relevant to the first.
The court appeared to conclude that no regulatory taking of
land alongside a body of water could ever result from an exercise
of Congress' power to regulate navigable waterways. But that
sweeping proposition seems highly dubious. Indeed, Lucas, the
seminal case in regulatory takings law, involved beachfront prop-
erty as to which all development had been prohibited by a state
entity.216 If the federal government 1 rather than a state agency had
enacted a comparable regulation, and could plausibly contend
that it served some navigational purpose, it seems doubtful that the
navigational servitude could be the basis for a finding that no tak-
ing had occurred. This is because the essence of the Supreme
Court's takings jurisprudence is that regulatory takings have the
same legal effect as direct appropriations of property. 21 Thus, if
there is a finding that a regulatory taking has occurred, there is no
212. 90 E 3d 790 at 796.
213. See id. at 795.
214. Id. at 796.
215. Id.
216. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1006 (1992).
217. Lucas involved a state regulation; the navigational servitude may only apply in the
case of federal regulation.
218. See, e.g., Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003 at 1014-15.
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principled reason why the Section 111 rule for calculating just
compensation should not also be applicable. In other words, the
owner should be entitled to the full measure ofjust compensation,
including any value of the land attributable to its location on navi-
gable water, and should not be limited to some artificially
truncated version ofjust compensation.219
The court's holding in 30.54 Acres would be more defensible if
it had simply declared that Section 111 does not affect particular
exercises of the navigational servitude doctrine involving the rule
of no compensation. The no-compensation rule discussed in Part
II.A of this Article confers on the government the power to order
the removal of structures, and to prohibit activities in or above the
riverbed that affect navigation. 20 Thus, for example, the Supreme
Court has held that the government may order a bridge which
spans a river to be altered (or even torn down) .221 Because the coal
tipple in 30.54 Acres protruded into the space above the navigable
waterway, prohibition of its use would fall under the traditional
rule, and there would be no obligation to compensate for the
value of the coal itself.
However, there is nothing inherent in the rule of no compensa-
tion that would preclude the landowner in 30.54 Acres from
maintaining that the regulation of the coal tipple resulted in a
regulatory taking of the adjoining land because, for example, it
had the effect of depriving the land of all of its economically bene-
ficial uses. As such, there is no sound reason for reading the
statutory words "real property shall be taken" in Section 111 to ex-
clude regulatory takings. As a matter of constitutional law, the rule
in Rands would presumably render most or all of the damages for
such a regulatory taking non-compensable. But since Section 111
legislatively abrogates the Rands rule, then if the landowner in
30.54 Acres was able to demonstrate that the coal tipple regulation
resulted in a regulatory taking of his land, it should have been
219. Another hypothetical case will help illustrate this point. Suppose the federal gov-
ernment enacted a prophylactic regulation that prohibited waterfront landowners from
entering their property (in order to prevent them from engaging in boating or swimming
activities that the government regarded as a hindrance to use of the navigable waterways),
and the landowners demonstrated that this amounted to a regulatory taking of their prop-
erty. In that event, it would be difficult tojustify a reading of Section 111 that would make it
inapplicable to the determination of their just compensation.
220. See supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text.
221. See, e.g., Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364, 397 (1907). Presumably,
the government only has the power to destroy (without payment of compensation) that part
of the bridge which spans the navigable waterway, and may not touch the portion which lies
shoreward of the high water mark. Of course, this limitation on its power would in most
cases have little practical significance.
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permitted to recover the full measure ofjust compensation for that
taking.22 And the legislative history of Section 111 demonstrates
that any "decrease or increase in the fair market value of real
property ... caused by the public improvement for which such
property is acquired ... will be disregarded in determining the
compensation for the property., 22 Thus, the fact that the govern-
ment has in fact exercised its power to prohibit a particular use
should not preclude payment of compensation where the prohibi-
tion deprives the landowner of all beneficial and productive use of
his or her property.
The court in 30.54 Acres also invoked legislative history in sup-
port of its construction of Section 111:
The legislative history of Section 111 indicates that Congress
intended to modify the rule of United States v. Rands only to
the extent of paying full compensation based on riparian lo-
cation in cases of actual acquisition of above the high water
mark real property. Section 111 "makes no change in existing
law" with respect to other aspects of the navigational servi-
tude. 24
The House Report and the Conference Report do indeed use
the phrase "when the United States acquires real property above the
normal high water mark of the navigable waters of the United
States,,225 and to that extent, they support the Court's conclusion
that Section 111 does not apply to takings other than direct ap-
propriations. The reference to "existing law" in the Report does
not, in its full context, provide any support for the Court's holding,
however. The House Report refers specifically to "existing law with
respect to the offsetting of special benefits to remaining real prop-
erty against the just compensation that would otherwise be paid for
the real property taken and for damages to real property resulting
[from] the taking and the purpose for which the real property is
222. The Supreme Court held even before development of its regulatory taking juris-
prudence that "[wihere the government by the construction of a dam or other public works
so floods lands belonging to an individual as to substantially destroy their value there is a
taking within the scope of the Fifth Amendment," even though the government has not
directly "appropriate[d] the title." United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 328 (1917). If land
subjected to this kind of flooding derived some of its value from its proximity to a navigable
waterway, then it would seem reasonable to apply Section 111 in such a fashion as to allow
the landowner to recover the full pre-taking value of his or her property.
223. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1782, at 23 (1970).
224. 90 E3d at 796 (citing H.R. REP. No. 91-1665, at 31 (1970)).
225. H.R. REP. No. 91-1665, at 30 (1970) (emphasis added).
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taken."2 26 Thus, the reference to "existing law" is limited to the off-
setting of special benefits in connection with the valuation of
remainder property.
IV. SECTION 111 AS AN EXAMPLE OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
INTENDED TO RECTIFY THE SUPREME COURT'S RESTRICTIVE
READING OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS FOR PROPERTY
OWNERS, AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER REFORMS
Section 111 is not the only instance in which Congress acted to
provide protections for property rights that the Supreme Court has
declined to recognize as a matter of constitutional law. The statutes
that authorize civil forfeiture of property connected to a drug of-
fense are another important example of this kind of congressional
action. The first statute that authorized civil proceedings to forfeit
property used (or intended to be used) to facilitate a violation of
the criminal provisions of the federal drug laws was enacted in
1970.227 This statutory provision, which is codified at 21 U.S.C.
881 (a) (4), has been used to forfeit vast numbers of "conveyances,"
including automobiles, trucks and boats. As originally enacted, the
statute contained no requirement that the government prove that
the owner of the property had some culpability in the misuse of
property. Nor did it provide a defense to owners who could prove
they had no such culpability. This meant that property owned by
one person could be forfeited on the basis of acts committed by
another person, even if the owner had no prior knowledge of or
involvement in the wrongful use.228
The absence of statutory protection for innocent owners in a
Puerto Rican statute that was nearly identical to the federal drug
forfeiture statute was challenged in the early 1970's in Calero-Toledo
v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. 229 In that case, a yacht owned by a yacht
leasing company was forfeited to Puerto Rican authorities after the
lessees of the yacht were found with a small quantity of marijuana
on board. The yacht company challenged the forfeiture as a viola-
tion of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as applied to
226. Id. at 31.
227. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
513, § 511,84 Stat. 1236, 1276-78 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a) (4) (1994)).
228. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 686 (1974).
229. As the Court observed in Calero-Toledo, the Puerto Rican forfeiture statute was
modeled after section 881 and differed from it in "unimportant" respects. Id. at 686-87,
n.25.
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the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court re-
jected the constitutional claim of the yacht company, citing prior
in rem forfeiture cases and the "punitive and deterrent" purposes
served by the statute.230
The Court's decision in Calero-Toledo was a harsh one in a num-
ber of respects. As a practical matter, the yacht leasing company
could have done very little to prevent the lessees from bringing
marijuana on board the boat. There is no suggestion in that case
that the company acted negligently in entrusting the yacht to the
lessees. Moreover, the Court in Calero-Toledo recognized that "it
would be difficult to conclude that forfeiture served legitimate
purposes and was not unduly oppressive" if an owner could prove
"not only that he was uninvolved in and unaware of the wrongful
activity, but also that he had done all that reasonably could be ex-
pected to prevent the proscribed use of his property ....
Congress acted to remedy by statute the Court's unfortunate in-
ability in Calero-Toledo to identify any protection for innocent
owners in the Constitution. In 1988, Congress amended section
881 (a) (4) to provide for an innocent owner defense.232 If an owner
could establish that the acts or omissions which gave rise to the
forfeiture were committed without his or her "knowledge, consent,
or willful blindness," forfeiture would be avoided.2 2 In 2000, Con-
gress enacted additional amendments to the federal drug
forfeiture law that were designed to increase protections for prop-
234
erty owners.
230. Id. at 683-88. More recently, in Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442 (1996), the Su-
preme Court rejected an innocent owner challenge to a forfeiture based on both the
Takings Clause (as applied to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment) and the Due Proc-
ess Clause. The Bennis decision was subjected to nearly universal criticism in the press and,
later, in scholarly articles. See Stefan B. Herpel, Toward a Constitutional Kleptocracy: Civil Forfei-
ture in America, 96 MICH. L. Rev. 1910, 1945 n.156 (1998) (discussing and citing op-ed pieces
criticizing the decision).
231. 416 U.S. at 689-90.
232. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6075(3), 102 Stat. 4324 (codi-
fied as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a) (4) (C) (1999)).
233. Id. Additional forfeiture provisions were also added to cover forfeiture of real es-
tate and forfeiture of the proceeds of illicit drug transactions. Congress enacted each of
these provisions with an innocent owner defense, even though the decision in Calero-Toledo
engendered some doubt as to whether the Court would have required such a defense as a
matter of constitutional law. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (6) and 21 U.S.C. §§ 881 (a) (6)-
(7) (1999).
234. Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-185, 114 Stat. 202-25
(1994). Among other things, this law changed existing law by placing the burden of proving
that property is forfeitable on the government, rather than placing the burden to disprove
forfeitability on the property owner. To be sure, there have been criticisms that Congress'
reforms of the drug forfeiture laws do not go far enough. Voters in three states, namely
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Forfeiture and condemnation actions, while very different, both
involve the destruction or seizure of private property rights. Con-
gress has acted in both areas because the Supreme Court has been
unwilling to recognize basic constitutional protections for property
rights in these contexts. These statutory enactments demonstrate
how Congress can play a vital role when the Court shirks its re-
sponsibility to enforce those provisions of the Constitution that
expressly mention property-namely, the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment and the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.
With regard to the navigational servitude, there are additional
steps that Congress should take to alleviate the oppressive effects
of that doctrine. First, Congress should amend Section 111 of the
Rivers and Harbors Act so that the severance damages paid to a
landowner in a partial takings case will include compensation for
any reduction in value to the remainder resulting from its reduced
proximity to a navigable waterway. As discussed above,23 5 Section
11 1 currently provides that severance damages shall not include
any amounts for lost or reduced access to a navigable waterway.
However, if landowners are to be guaranteed a full measure ofjust
compensation for the property rights they have lost, then they
should also receive full compensation for any injury to the remain-
der parcel. The standard counter-argument-i.e., the suggestion
that this will put a greater burden on the governmental treasury in
connection with public projects-would require its proponent to
assume that it is appropriate to treat one class of landowners dif-
ferent from another class in order to benefit the entire public.
In addition, Congress should amend Section 11 1 to provide that
the navigational servitude shall not apply to private property rights
existing in land which was formerly part of a riverbed, but was later
filled by natural or artificial means. This has not proved to be
much of a problem in practical terms, but there is no reason why
this potential cloud on titles should not be removed. As discussed
above,2 6 this aspect of the doctrine has given rise to concerns that
parts of New York City and San Francisco which were formerly un-
derwater, but have since been filled and developed, could be taken
without compensation.
Massachusetts, Utah, and Oregon, are considering initiatives that would actually abolish civil
forfeiture and replace it with criminal forfeiture. Generally speaking, criminal forfeiture
statutes require the government to convict the owner of a crime before it can forfeit that
person's property. See Karen Dillon, Forfeiture Reforms Go Before Voters: Proposals on Ballots in
Three States, KANSAS CITY STAR, Oct. 8, 2000, at Al.
235. See supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
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Finally, Congress should legislatively overrule the decision of the
Third Circuit in United States v. 30.54 Acres of Land,237 which held
that Section 111 applied only to formal eminent domain proceed-
ings, and not to so-called regulatory takings. For the reasons
discussed above, that interpretation of Section 111 is highly dubi-
ous. First, Congress should make it clear that contrary to the Third
Circuit's holding, a regulation of navigable waterways which would
not otherwise require the payment of compensation may require
compensation if it deprives the landowner of all economically
beneficial use of his or her adjoining land or otherwise amounts to
a regulatory taking of that land. This would not constitute a com-
plete abrogation of the navigational servitude, since the doctrine
would still bar compensation when its exercise does not deprive
landowners of all beneficial use of their land. Second, Congress
should specifically provide that if a regulation made pursuant to
Congress' authority to regulate navigable waterways goes so far as
to amount to a regulatory taking of property, then the landowner
should receive the benefit of the Section 111 rule for computing
damages. Once again, the counter-argument that this would im-
pose too great a burden on the public treasury would require its
proponent to assume that it is appropriate to treat two similarly
situated groups of landowners in a disparate fashion.
CONCLUSION
The navigational servitude doctrine's no-compensation rule
represents one of the very few judicially-created exceptions to the
federal government's Fifth Amendment obligation to pay just
compensation when it takes property. Perhaps the most onerous
and indefensible outgrowth of this rule has been the Supreme
Court's holding in Rands. Under the Rands rule, when the federal
government condemns land on or near a navigable waterway, it has
no obligation to pay the full measure of just compensation to the
landowner. Instead, it is permitted to exclude from the measure of
just compensation any element of value attributable to the land's
access or proximity to a navigable waterway.
Congress responded to the Court's decision in Rands by enacting
Section 111 of the Rivers and Harbors Act, which provides, as a mat-
ter of legislative grace, a right to compensation which the Supreme
237. 90 F.3d 790 (3d Cir. 1996).
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Court has declared that Congress is not constitutionally obligated to
provide. Section 111 requires that the amount of just compensa-
tion paid to any landowner for land appropriated by the
government must include any value attributable to the land's prox-
imity to a navigable waterway.
Section 111 effectively demonstrates Congress' power to remedy
the hardship and injustice that result from the Supreme Court's
unwillingness to adequately enforce the clauses of the federal con-
stitution that expressly protect property rights, including the Fifth
Amendment's Takings Clause and the Due Process Clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. It would be appropriate for
Congress to consider additional legislation to ameliorate the
harshness of certain aspects of the navigational servitude that re-
main even after the passage of Section 111.
The Supreme Court's recent treatment of federalism and regu-
138latory taking issues suggests that the Court may be inclined to
undo some of the harsher effects of the navigational servitude doc-
trine as it has developed over the past two centuries. In light of the
Court's recent federalism cases, which, for the first time since the
1930s, invalidated federal statutes as beyond Congress' power to
regulate interstate commerce, the Court may be more willing to
carefully examine whether a particular regulation of a navigable
waterway is within that power. The Court may decide that certain
waterway regulation is so local in its focus that it is within the sole
province of the individual states. If a particular form of regulation
is impermissible, then the government would not be able to invoke
the navigational servitude as a defense.
Under the Supreme Court's recent regulatory taking cases, even
if the Court concludes that a particular regulation is within the
power of the federal government, it may at least be willing to limit
the scope of the navigational servitude doctrine. The essence of
the Court's approach to regulatory takings has been that if regula-
tion goes too far in its impact on a landowner, the government
must pay just compensation to the landowner.2 3 9 This general ap-
proach suggests that the Court may be more willing than it was in
the past to scrutinize regulation or other governmental activities to
determine whether such activities serve traditional navigational
purposes, and, thus, whether the rule of no compensation is appli-
cable. If the Court concludes that a regulation goes well beyond
traditional navigational purposes, as it did in Kaiser Aetna, it may be
willing to hold that the navigation servitude is not applicable, and
238. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
239. See supra note 75.
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hence that the government must pay just compensation to the af-
fected landowner. Such an approach would enable the Court to
avoid the rather drastic step of invalidating a regulation with only a
tenuous relationship to interstate commerce, while at the same
time protecting the property rights of landowners.
Section 111 and the view of the navigation servitude reflected in
the Rands case may no longer represent an appropriate balance of
the competing public and private interests implicated in this area.
Even if a Supreme Court newly sensitized to the need to protect
private property interests against governmental intrusion and over-
extension of federal authority is unwilling to readjust the balance,
Congress may step in again to ensure that property rights are ade-
quately protected.

